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BERMAS, GOFFMAN, AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE·
James J. Chriss
University of Pennsylvania
In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1984, 1987) argues that
because Goffman's dramaturgy emphasizes the goal-oriented or strategic
nature of actors' self-presentations, it fails to establish the conditions for
noncoerced or reasoned communication. After reviewing Habermas's negative reading of Goffman, I assess both Habermas's and Goffman's theories
in the context of professional practice and organizational behavior. 1 suggest
that certain programs in the social psychology of organizations, such as
Argyris and Schon's (1974) action research, share Habermas's one-sided
view of Goffman 's actor as an opportunistic, insincere manipulator. This misreading of Goffman results from a fundamental confusion over the ontology
and epistemology of "impression management." I conclude that if Habermas's theory of communicative action is to advance further, that is, if it is
ever to adequately link with the empirical social world, it must come to more
concrete terms with the nature of the presented self.

O

ver the past two decades researchers
in the social sciences and humanities
have been taking the "linguistic turn," meaning that they are turning their attention to issues of the self and to theories of communicative conduct or practice. Discussions of the
processes or theories of the self are incomplete, however, if they are not formulated or
understood within a broader analytical
framework. Goffman's (e.g., 1959, 1971,
1974) dramaturgical theory of action, although providing important perceptions and
descriptions of the vagaries of face-to-face
behavior, does not on its own offer much of
• Direct correspondence to James J. Chriss, Department of Sociology, 3718 Locust Walk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 191046299. A much abridged version of this paper was
presented on August 9 at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in
Los Angeles, CA. I thank Hugh Willmott, David
Sciulli, John Forester, and Ivar Berg for providing helpful comments on several earlier drafts. I
also thank the ASR reviewers for their comments.
Much of this paper is drawn from Chapter 9 of
my Ph.D. dissertation (Chriss 1994a). For an
early cursory statement on the HabermasGoffman problem, see Chriss (1992). [The reviewers acknowledged by the author are Chris
Argyris and Ben Agger. -ED.]

a sense of how these microprocesses are
linked to larger social structures.
On the other hand, Talcott Parsons's (1951,
1978) architectonic social systems schema
provides a blueprint, a mapping, or a grid for
the understanding, or at least the conceptualization of, whole social systems. Parsons attempted to reduce the massive complexity of
social systems to a few crucial elements or
processes. This analytical gambit amounted
to delineating four functional requisites of
social systems: adaptation, goal-attainment,
integration, and latent pattern-maintenance
(AGIL). Then he argued, by sheer force of
reason (Parsons's notion of "analytical realism"), that there exists parallel functional
processes at all other levels of the social system. 1
I For example, Parsons argued that the process
of allocating roles in society was analogous to the
internalization, through socialization, of cultural
norms and values in the individual. As Parsons
(1951) states, "The allocation of personnel between roles in the social system and the socialization processes of the individual are clearly the
same processes viewed in different perspectives"
(p. 207). Both processes, then, have similar functional significances at their respective levels of
generality or specificity, namely that of integration.

Although Parsons attempted to explain social microprocesses through his AGIL
schema, a majority of researchers have not
employed his blueprint in their analyses.
Parsons's schema is considered by many to
be bombastic, overly abstract, and not particularly amenable to empirical testing (but
see Lidz 1986). The sense that Parsons's
schema is detached from reality-from the
empirical social world-led to an avalanche
of criticisms beginning in the 1950s and extending until his death in 1979 and even beyond (Dahrendorf 1958; Gouldner 1970;
Mills 1959; Wrong 1961).
Much of this criticism of Parsons's program was, of course, concentrated in the academic left, or "radical sociology," and especially in Marxist or neo-Marxist thought. A
few observers have suggested, for example,
that Parsons's (1937) "voluntaristic theory of
action" is notable in that it includes almost
no discussion of the works of Marx (Agger
1992; Gouldner 1970). Parsons's program
thus offered, at least in the minds of some
left-leaning critics, a handy alternative to the
Hegelian Marxism prevalent in Europe since
the 1920s (Agger 1992:57).
In sociology, the most successful wing of
Marxist thought and research has been
Frankfurt School critical theory (Kincheloe
and McLaren 1994). Horkheimer, Adorno,
and Marcuse are some of the thinkers who
led the way toward establishing critical
theory and extending its influence in sociology, largely through the successes of a number of applied research programs (such as
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and
Sanford's [1950] study of the authoritarian
personality). In extending and updating
Marx's legacy, the goal of Frankfurt School
thinkers was to identify, uncover, and hopefully ameliorate oppressive social structures
or circumstances. Whereas Marx had concentrated primarily on the objective features
of oppression, such as those connected with
political power and economics, the new critical theory called for a return to philosophy,
and even to psychoanalysis, to thoroughly
diagnose the pathologies of modern culture.
This emphasis of critical theory continued
until the early 1970s, when a new version of
critical theory-call it neo-critical theoryemerged, largely through the efforts of
Habermas. Habermas's (1971, 1975) pro-

gram carried forward some elements of the
Horkheimerl Adorno version of critical
theory. For example, he retained their critical view of positivism and their goal of establishing a new theory of knowledge, which
would, in dialectic fashion, take into account
the social, historical, and cultural contexts
within which that knowledge is formulated
and accepted (i.e., the sociology of knowledge; see Dahl 1995).
But departing from the original Frankfurt
School tradition, which was largely skeptical
of the ability of established science to contribute to the good life, Habermas aimed to
rescue science and the Enlightenment-inspired force of reason through a search for
the foundations of knowledge (Bottomore
1984). Habermas argued that if we are indeed interested in identifying and eradicating oppressive social structures, we must establish a foundation or basis upon which we
can say, with some degree of certainty, what
is or is not a liberative or oppressive social
structure. This understanding of social structure can be forged only if critical theorists
turn their attention back to conceptualizing
entire social systems, focusing once again on
certain crucial elements heretofore neglected
in the social science literature.
This attention to systems theory led
Habermas inexorably to an analysis of the
works of Parsons. Habermas (1987) states,
for example, that "no theory of society can
be taken seriously today if it does not at least
situate itself with respect to Parsons" (p.
199). This is not to say, of course, that
Habermas was wholly enamored of Parsons's
theory. Habermas argues that Parsons's work
displays a deep internal tension between the
idealist tradition of social action and the
positivist tradition of social systems. In essence, Parsons's theory never successfully
coupled "system" to "Iifeworld" (but see
Munch 1993).2 This is because Parsons was
2 Habermas (I984:82) argues that, for analytical reasons, we need to distinguish between
"world" and "lifeworld," especially with regard
to discussing the "rationalization of the
lifeworld." As human beings we rely, often in
taken-for-granted fashion, on a cultural stock of
knowledge which, because it is already
intersubjectively shared, both forms the background for communicative action and provides
the foundation for our routine social doings. The

generally inattentive to talk-to speech
theory or to linguistic analysis, more generally. Parsons chose instead to attend to broad
conceptions of culture, as in the culture, personality, social system triad, and this focus
kept his theory of social action suspended
within the system or functionalist side of the
analytical divide.
On the other hand, according to Habermas,
Goffman's dramaturgical theory, although
giving attention to social action or lifeworld
processes, is suspended in the idealist tradition, and therefore it was never in a position
to link adequately to systems theory. Goffman's mistake was that he never understood,
perhaps never realized, that talk itself could
contain the potential for a universal foundation for critical theory that could traverse the
lifeworid-systems divide. This foundation is,
as Habermas argues, the universal validity
claims inherent in all speech (to be discussed
more thoroughly below).3

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION IN
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Goffman's work stands on its own as a representation of the lifeworld processes of social interaction and face-to-face behavior. If
we are ever to reconcile Parsons's systems
theory with Goffman's work on the microprocesses of communication, it seems that
Habermas's theory of communicative action
may serve well, as it has assimilated crucial
aspects of Parsons's schema.
"lifeworld" is an unthematized realm that, suffused as it is with shared cultural knowledge, allows us to refer thematically to something that
actually exists in the objective world. For an extended critique of Habermas's formulation of
Iifeworld, see Rosenthal (1992).
3 Habermas's theory of communicative action
can be thought of as a meso theory providing
links from the macro or systems analytical realm
to the micro or lifeworld analytical realm. House,
Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt's (1995) meso
theory of organizational behavior, although not
drawing from Habermas per se, nevertheless
shares some affinities with Habermas's program,
such as their criticism of prevailing general psychological theories in the field of organizational
behavior (OB), which tend to be context-free and
rarely take into account macro or structural variables.

Any further discussions of Goffman, Parsons, Habermas, and their interrelation at this
high level of theoretical abstraction runs the
risk of disintegrating into confusion, into
something even less than a patchwork of
ideas. Thus, I move now toward a concrete
area of concern to facilitate this discussion
of communicative action: professional practices, such as planning, consulting, and
evaluation.
I choose the substantive area of professional practice because I have worked as a
consultant (mainly in business and education)
and evaluator (in program planning and
evaluation with philanthropic organizations),
and of course I did much of this work through
observing talk in formal (business or organizational) settings. For example, consultants,
planners, or evaluators may be hired by a
business to observe the nature of interactions
taking place between personnel across various organizational hierarchies (Stein 1994).
Organizations hiring consultants to do
such work are concerned, of course, with the
bottom line-improving organizational communication, performance, or perhaps even
morale. 4 Sociologists familiar with Habermas's or Goffman's works may well recognize this particular organizational problem as
one of "systematically distorted communication" (Habermas 1987). The goal of the consultant in such a case is to recommend actions for improving the organization's com4 With respect to morale, an organization may
hire a consultant if there is a widespread organizational perception that employee morale is low
or that managers are not effective in motivating
in their employees a sense of organizational
pride, loyalty, or teamwork. The literature on
problems and issues of this sort falls somewhat
outside the bounds of sociology per se, residing
instead in literature on organizations and especially management. The practice of compelling
employees to demonstrate loyalty to a particular
set of organizational values has received a scathing critique from Willmott (1993), who states:

Especially in cases where insecure, fashion-conscious management strives to 'modernize' its
practices, aided and abetted by consultants who
prey upon managers' vulnerability, a paradoxical
consequence of culture-strengthening programmes is a further degradation and distortion
of communication as employees instrumentally
adapt their behaviour to conform with the relevant
corporate code. (P. 536)

municative practices (Felts 1992; Hakel
1994).
A few professional planning consultants,
such as Forester (1989, 1992) and Schroyer
(1973), have made explicit connections between their day-to-day consulting work and
Habermas's theory of communicative action.
Other scholars, such as Sciulli (1992a) and
Frankford (1994), are actively working on
programs that attempt to implement or assess
Habermas's ideas within the context of professional or business practices. For the most
part, however, the theory of communicative
action remains distant from practice. Frankford (1994) and others have suggested that
although critical theory's major goal has always been to link theory to practice, attempts
such as Habermas's to facilitate such links
have not been successful. Just as with
Parsons's AGIL schema, Habermas has faced
the difficulty of making his abstract theory
relevant to the empirical social world.
The guiding idea of my paper is that Goffman's observations on face-to-face interaction, and especially his taxonomy of verbal
presentations of self, may be just the sort of
empirically-grounded research to provide
links from theory to practice. I return in the
next section to the case of business consulting, specifically Argyris and Schon's (1974)
program of "action research." I illustrate that
Habermas's theory of communicative action
is relevant even in those cases where the
practitioners themselves may be unaware of
such theory-practice links.5 Thus, I illustrate
5 Until 1985, Argyris and his associates
(Argyris, Putnam, and Smith 1985) made no explicit mention of the relevance of Habermas and
critical theory to their own work, such as in the
following quote:

Action science is not alone in advocating that
communities of inquiry be enacted in communities of practice. This formulation also seems appropriate to critical theory as articulated by theorists of the Frankfurt School. Habermas speaks of
creating conditions that approximate the 'ideal
speech situation,' which would allow human beings to come to a rational consensus about how to
conduct their affairs. To our knowledge. however.
Habermas has not devoted his energies to creating such conditions in the real world. (P. 35; italics added)
For an interesting discussion that compares and
contrasts Habermas's critical theory with action
research, see Ledoux (1981).

the potential applicability of Habermas's
theory within business and professional settings where consultants are paid to observe
organizational actors' social and verbal interaction.
I address a final issue, however, before
continuing. One could very well argue that
my attempt to analyze Habermas, Goffman,
and issues of communicative action within
the context of organizations is fatally flawed
because, by their very nature, formal organizations and other administrative entities are
based, not on communicative rationality, but
on purposive and instrumental rationality.
Cooke (1994), for example, notes that "the
administrative system does indeed represent
a mechanism of action coordination external
to the lifeworld" (p. 20).
Habermas (1987) admits that even within
formal organizations a number of routine interactions between organizational members
are connected via the mechanism of mutual
understanding-that is, on some crucial levels communicative action is assured or at
least made possible between these organizational actors. As Habermas (1987) continues,
Members of organizations act communicatively
only with reservation. They know they can
have recourse to formal regulations, not only
in exceptional but in routine cases; there is no
necessity for achieving consensus by communicative means . . . . innerorganizational relations constituted via membership do not replace communicative action, but they do
disempower its validity basis so as to provide
the legitimate possibility of redefining at will
spheres of action oriented to mutual understanding into action situations stripped of
Iifeworld contexts and no longer directed to
achieving consensus. (Pp. 310-11)

Although I am sympathetic to criticisms
that, following Cooke (1994) and Habermas
(1984, 1987), point out the instrumental, possibly even coercive nature of organizations, I
argue that there are equally pernicious impediments to engaging in noncoerced or reasoned communicative interaction within the
boundaries of the lifeworld itself. Granted,
actors may very well be ethically neutralized
by the formal-legal constitution of action
systems typical of organizations-this
amounting to a distortion of lifeworld processes via the incursion of systems imperatives. Nevertheless, there always exists the

possibility that certain forms of action, such
as strategic action, although emanating from
the lifeworld itself, are nevertheless parasitic
on communicative action, thereby hampering
actors' ability to reach understanding. 6
With this caveat in mind, let us turn now
to a discussion of Argyris's action research.

knowledge, orientations, and strategies
undergirding and informing the actual social
practices of individuals in given situations.
As Argyris and Schon (1974) state, "Theories-in-use are means for getting what we
want. They specify strategies for resolving
conflicts, making a living, closing a deal, organizing a neighborhood-indeed, for every
kind of intended consequence" (p. 15).
ARGYRIS, SCHON, AND ACTION
Argyris and Schon are careful to distinRESEARCH
guish theories-in-use from mere "espoused
For several decades Argyris, Schon, and theories," the latter being those theories of
other researchers have been involved in what action to which actors or organizations give
is variably described as "action research," written or spoken allegiance. The idea is that
"action inquiry," or "action science," a pro- we cannot be certain of deriving a person's
gram for integrating thought and action, es- theories-in-use simply by asking why he or
pecially in the context of professional prac- she did X or Y under condition Z; a person
tice (Argyris 1993a, 1993b; Argyris et a1. may not even be aware of incompatibilities
1985; Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989; Schon between their espoused theories and theo1983; Torbert 1991; Whyte 1991). Those ries-in-use. Likewise, an organization may
who work as evaluators, planners, consult- . have a written code of directives or a formal
ants, psychiatrists, lawyers, architects, case- manifest pertaining to organizational goals or
workers, and so forth, spend years receiving purpose: yet their overtly stated positionformal and rigorous training in a variety of the organization's "espoused theory"-may
diagnostic techniques that give them effica- not align with actual organizational praccious means for assessing and intervening in tices. 7
their world.
.
Argyris and Schon's (1974) research
Argyris and Schon (1974) provide the fol- points to a particular model that accounts for
lowing account of the logic underlying their persons' typical theories-in-use, which they
refer to as "Model I." This model designates
own action program:
All human beings-not only professional prac- (1) a group of governing variables, or the
titioners-need to become competent in taking goals research study participants strove to
action and simultaneously reflecting on the ac- achieve; (2) action strategies, these being the
tion to learn from it. The following pages pro- actual strategies participants adopted; (3)
vide a conceptual framework for this task by consequences for the behavioral world; and
analyzing the theories of action that determine (4) consequences for learning.
all deliberate human behavior, how these theories of action are formed, how they come to
change, and in what senses they may be con7 Argyris and Schon, citing Scott (1969), illussidered adequate or inadequate. (P. 4)
trate the incompatibility between espoused theories and theories-in-use among workers in an
In the authors' assessment, then, all deliberaagency for the blind. The organization's official
tive action, whether conducted by profes- position, as represented in written documents and
sionals in a work setting or by laypersons in employee testimony (its espoused theory), holds
the course of their everyday lives, is based that "the blind are potentially independent, that
upon some theory of action or conduct, how- agencies for the blind function to help the blind
ever tacit or unthematized this theory may be realize that potential. The theories-in-use, howin the minds of actors. The authors suggest ever, assume that the blind are basically depenthat one of the primary goals of their pro- dent on the agencies, that it is a function of the
gram is to help identify what they call "theo- agencies to sustain the dependence through continuing service, and that the function of a blind
ries-in-use," that is, the actual assumptions,
person is to adapt to life in an agency setting"
(Argyris and Schon 1974:8). Note also that this
6 As we shall see later, Habermas argues that
idea parallels Goffman' s discussions of virtual
dramaturgical action is parasitic on communica- versus actual identity (1963b) and total institutions (1961 a).
tive action as well.

Particularly important are the consequences for the behavioral world resulting
from the various action strategies employed
by research study participants and the governing variables underlying these strategies.
For example, if an actor's primary orientation to the world is to define goals and try to
achieve them (the famous ends-means
schema), then a typical action strategy would
be to design and manage the environment
unilaterally (e.g., by being persuasive or by
appealing to larger goals). When actors find
themselves in such situations or perceive
situations in such a light, the consequences
for the behavioral world are such that actors
are seen by others as defensive (e.g., having
to defend a particular line of action or provide rationale), as inconsistent (e.g., in cases
where the chosen means don't appear to
align well with desired or stated ends), as
competitive, controlling, manipulative, or
any number of other negative consequences.
The implications of Model I, according to
Argyris and Schon (1974), is that, other
things being equal, behavior is typically defensive and ultimately dysfunctional. This
defensiveness is passed on across generations, as children are socialized into or learn
Model I behavior from their parents, peers,
and significant others insofar as the behavioral worlds of the family, school, and elsewhere conform to the assumptions of Model
I (Argyris and Schon 1974:82). As Argyris
and Schon (1974) state,
Adults programmed with these [Model I] values tend to create human relationships that emphasize competitiveness, withholding help
from others, conformity, covert antagonism,
and mistrust while deemphasizing cooperation,
helping others, individuality, and trust. (P. 83)

The authors then make an assertion that
has grave implications for my work on Goffman, Habermas, and communicative action:
Because th~se dysfunctional Model I values
are embedded in our culture and remain there
as unseen or unthematized aspects of daily
life, they are "confirmed" by societal members and act as real, authentic, natural, or inevitable guidelines for directing groups or
individuals in their dealings with one another. Hence, "Interpersonal diplomacy, being civilized, withholding feelings, and suppressing anger and hurt are but a few com-

mon examples of what individuals are taught
to do to help maintain harmony in interpersonal relationships" (Argyris and Schon
1974:83).
Argyris and Schon argue that the tools of
interpersonal diplomacy-things like deference and demeanor, politeness, embarrassment, norms of etiquette, face work, remedial and supportive interchanges, accounts
and apologies, tolerance, access rituals, and
role distance (Goffman 1953, 1959, 1961b,
1963a, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1981)-actually support Model I, thereby sustaining
and perpetuating the dysfunctional behaviors
associated with it. In fact, from the perspective of Argyris and Schon, Goffman's lifelong work was dedicated to unearthing, describing, and systematizing humanity's destructive but "natural" Model I behavior. 8
What this implies, then, is that Goffman's
description of the interaction order, and the
vast array of interpersonal rituals contained
therein, amounts to documenting the ways
persons go about the business of living and
coping in a world of "pseudo-authenticity."
Model I generates and regenerates a state of
pseudo-authenticity, especially insofar as
persons tend to minimize negative feelings
and their expression.
As we have seen, then, the governing variables of Model I consist of competitive, win/
R I argue (Chriss forthcoming) that the behaviors that Argyris and Schon describe as self-sealing, defensive, and ultimately destructive actually
embody the negational self. The negational self
is a self by default in that most public declarations of self amount to specifying what the self is
not. This can be accomplished through role distancing or through self-effacement and modesty
about the self. Through these behaviors persons
attempt to demonstrate the ideals of a well-demeaned individual. Habermas (1984), too, sides
with Argyris and Schon in emphasizing truth-telling as part and parcel to reasoned communication,
thereby tending to cast politeness and other etiquette norms into the realm of the irrational since
they can work to mask persons' truthful assessments of a situation. Kingwell (1993:392) warns,
however, that any reconstruction of rational presuppositions in communication, such as embodied in Habermas's theory of communicative action, would have to include those propositions associated with politeness, especially as specified
by Grice (1975) and Goffman (e.g., 1959, 1967,
1963a, 1971).

lose, rational, and diplomatic behaviors that
are "self-sealing.,,9 These are examples of
what Habermas (1984, 1987) would call "systematically distorted communication." For
most large-scale organizations, distorted
communication is a day-to-day, operational
reality. As Forester (1989) explains,
Whether in the public or private sector, organizations are not egalitarian utopias; differences
of status, power and authority, information and
expertise, interests and desires abound. Those
realities-including the incompetent manager,
the arrogant section head, the misinformed
staff analyst, the fight between developer and
regulator-cannot be wished away. (P. 8)
It is no great revelation that much of the
dysfunctional Model I behavior with which
Argyris and Schon are concerned is expressed or expressible in talk. Likewise, it is
no surprise that the corrective measures
which they propound-as specified in their
"Model II" program of theories-in-use-are
targeted at organizational communication
and face-to-face behavior.
Argyris and Schon (1974) suggest that
Model II's governing variables are an improvement over Modell's because they are
not self-sealing, but instead tend to permit
more effective testing of interactants' assumptions and greater learning about one's
effectiveness as a communicator and/or interpreter. For example, the primary governing
variable of Model II, namely maximizing
valid information, means that an actor provides others with directly observable data so
that others may make valid attributions about
the actor (Argyris and Schon 1974:86). The
organizational consultant's job, then, is to
show organizational actors how to make the
transition from Model I-self-sealing behavior-to Model II-open and honest behavior
based on maximizing valid information,
maximizing free and informed choices, and
maximizing internal commitments to decisions made. Argyris and Schon spell out in
some detail the steps that instructors typi9 "Self-sealing" behavior is behavior that closes
off public testing of the assumptions of one's or
other's theories-in-use, thereby reducing learning
and hence freezing actors in static and potentially
destructive worlds. An example of the self-sealing process is as follows. Actor A believes that
actor B is defensive: If A cannot test this belief

cally take in helping participants actually
learn Model II behavior (see 1974:110-136).
The differences between Habermas and
Goffman is thus illuminated by the analysis
of the work of consultants, especially those
who are considered experts in the observation of face-to-face interaction in a variety of
settings-often organizational ones.
The empirical context thus established, I
now return to Habermas's theory itself. In an
attempt to describe and clarify the methods
of reasoning employed by Habermas in his
Theory of Communicative Action (1984,
1987), Baldamus (1992: 100) provided a citation analysis of that work. Not surprisingly,
Baldamus found that of the 220 authors cited
by Habermas, the top 5 were (by total number of citations) Parsons (180), Weber (140),
Durkheim (76), Mead (75), and Marx (69).
Much further down the list, cited only 4
times, is Goffman. I evaluate Habermas's
brief treatment of Goffman and suggest the
ways in which Goffman's theory might help
connect Habermas's overtly analytical theory
of communicative action to the empirical social world.

HABERMAS ON THE CONCEPTS OF
TELEOLOGICAL, NORMATIVE,
DRAMATURGICAL, AND
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
Habermas (1984) defines "communicative
action" as "the interaction of at least two
subjects capable of speech and action who
establish interpersonal relations (whether by
verbal or by extra-verbal means)" (p. 86).10
and if A acts according to his hunch, B probably
wonders why A is behaving in this way. Therefore B acts cautiously. A senses B's caution and
may interpret it as evidence that B is indeed defensive. A believes that if he were to reveal his
feeling that B is defensive, his relationship with
B would become less manageable. A's reluctance
to confront B means that B in turn need not confront the incongruity between B' s espoused
theory and his theory-in-use. But also as a result,
A's behavior is incongruent with his values. The
norms supporting incongruity and minimizing expression of negative feelings are reinforced.
thereby exacerbating A's negative or uncertain
feelings about B (Argyris and Schon 1974:77).
10 This obviously excludes so-called "selftalk." Goffman (1978, 1981) deals with specific

Obviously, language is itself prominent in
Habermas's model-it is the medium
through which individuals interpret each
other's plans of action while negotiating definitions of the situation. Ideally these negotiations, if they are to lead at all to a final
(even if only provisional) definition of the
situation, must first and foremost define consensus among the participants.
This process of achieving understanding
through language is for Habermas the defining problem in the theory of communicative
action. As Habermas (1984) explains, "The
concept of reaching an understanding suggests a rationally motivated agreement
among participants that is measured against
criticizable validity claims" (p. 75). Habermas's theory of communicative action, then,
attempts to treat rationality from a universalistic perspective. That is, in attempting to delineate the normative foundations of a critical theory, Habermas suggests that these essential concrete norms are implicit in the validity claims of all speech.
Habermas then expands this provisional
concept of communicative rationality by analyzing the ontological assumptions of rationality embedded in a variety of social-scientific theories of action. Habermas (1984:85)
suggests that this "profusion of action concepts" can be reduced in essence "to four basic, analytically distinguishable concepts" or
theoretical traditions: (1) teleological action,
(2) normatively regulated action, (3) dramaturgical action, and (4) his own communicative action.
Habermas evaluates the worthiness and sophistication of the four theoretical perspectives on action with respect to how each satisfies the criteria of a three-world model.
Habermas's (1984:95) three analytical
worlds correspond to the three ways social
actors relate to the everyday world, namely,
objectively, socially, and subjectively. This
threefold relation of communicative actors to
their world identifies different forms or diforms of self-talk, such as imprecations and
curses (e.g., "ouch!," "damn!," "jeez!," "oops!").
Habermas (1979) chastises Goffman, however,
for lumping together identity-threatening acts,
which are authentic emotional-expressive instances of self-talk, with spill cries, such as those
mentioned above, which are more impulsive and
not overtly calculated as face-saving devices.

mensions of understanding that members of
a society gain as a result of their interaction
with others as well as through other routine
social practices. Habermas argues that the
four theoretical perspectives on action vary
in the extent to which each is able to illuminate these relations. He lists these theories in
rank order: Teleological action is at the weak
end of the explanatory spectrum, and progressing to the most efficacious of the theories, Habermas's own communicative action
theory is at the strong end.

Teleological Action
Since teleological concepts of action-such
as those of utilitarianism, behaviorism, or rational-choice theory-emphasize primarily
the strategic or goal-oriented calculations actors employ in pursuing courses of action,
Habermas suggests that this concept can only
account for one world, namely the objective
world. As the actor is engaged in a decision
calculus that takes into account the elements
of his or her action options in relation to the
constraints and exigencies of the objective
world, the intended effect in the world or the
results of his or her strivings will in the end
be judged a success or failure according to
criteria of truth and efficacy (Habermas
1984:87). The implications of teleological
theory is that action, as realized through the
cognitive processes of a knowing subject, is
represented only as a relation between the
actor and a world. At the level of its ontological presuppositions, then, teleological
action operates from a highly demarcated,
and for Habermas's purposes, insufficient
one-world concept.

Normatively Regulated Action
Whereas teleological action operates from a
limited one-world perspective, normatively
regulated action (such as Parsons) presupposes relations between an actor and two
worlds (Habermas 1984:88). Actors depicted
in the normatively regulated concept of action are endowed with a "motivational complex" in addition to teleology's lower-level
"cognitive complex." The motivational complex makes norm-conformative behavior possible in that actors judge whether or not the
actions of themselves or another actor are in

accord with eXisting norms (Habermas
1984:89). Beyond providing judgments of
the extent to which actions are successful or
unsuccessful in relation to the objective
world, the normatively regulated model of
action also provides for judgments of an actor in his or her relation to the social world,
insofar as the actor is able to comply with
(or is unable or chooses not to meet) the normative expectations of the members of his or
her social group. This is a two-world model
because, as Habermas (1984) explains, the
concept of norm-con formative action "presupposes that the agent can distinguish the
factual [objective] from the normative elements of an action situation, that is, conditions and means from values" (p. 90).

Goffman's Dramaturgical Model of Action
Habermas then discusses the concept of
dramaturgical action. Like normatively regulated action, dramaturgical action provides a
two-world model, the two worlds comprising
the objective and subjective dimensions of an
actor's relation to the world. Goffman's actor
"works the system for the enhancement of
self' through self-presentation and impression management. This idea is, for Habermas,
strongly reminiscent of the kind of goalorientedness characteristic of teleological
(strategic) action. As Habermas (1984) states,
"The dramaturgical qualities of action are in
a certain way parasitic; they rest on a structure of goal-directed action" (p. 90).
In addition to the objective world, dramaturgical action depicts a subjective world;
actors involved in self-presentation must
form a "visible public" with regard to their
audience. For the theorist, then, this model of
action opens up a subjective world of actors
making "staged presentations" before a group
of others. In other words, we peer inside the
"black box" of the subjective workings lurking behind and animating an actor's overt
behavior. As Habermas (1984) explains, the
concept of dramaturgical action suggests that
"the actor is oriented to his own subjective
world in the presence of his public" (p. 93).
Important to note here is that unlike the
concept of normatively regulated action,
Habermas argues that dramaturgical action
does not allow for understanding or explaining the social world. In fact, he suggests that

all three of the aforementioned action concepts are deficient with respect to at least one
of the three worlds.
Although each of the concepts (teleological, normatively regulated, and dramaturgical action) presupposes the importance of
language in explaining an actor's relation to
the world, Habermas suggests that only communicative action incorporates language as a
medium for reasoned or noncoerced action-.
a medium through which actors can actually
gain understanding and consensus as members of a societal community. As Habermas
(1984) explains,
Only the communicative model of action presupposes language as a medium of uncurtailed
communication whereby speakers and hearers,
out of the context of their preinterpreted
Iifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the
objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation. (P. 95)
It is my position that Habermas's diagnosis of the deficiencies of teleological, normatively regulated, and dramaturgical concepts
of action in explicating certain dimensions of
his three-world model is for the most part
sound. However, I explore further Habermas's judgment that dramaturgical action
fails to adequately specify actors' relations
to the social world. I believe, in fact, that
Habermas's theory of communicative action
may be fruitfully recast through the prism of
Goffman's (1974) frame analysis, especially
with reference to "The Frame Analysis of
Talk" (Goffman 1974, chap. 13:496-559).11
Before moving on, however, I first review
II Because Habermas published Communicative
Action in 1981 (translated from German in 1984),

it is perhaps the case that he had not yet read
Goffman's Frame Analysis, which was first published in 1974 (and translated into German in
1980). Habermas never cites Frame Analysis, and
it is hard to imagine that he would have come to
the same conclusions regarding the inadequacies
of dramaturgical action for his own theory of communicative action had he been familiar with its
major arguments. However, Habermas (1979) was
familiar with a paper of Goffman's-"Response
Cries" (Goffman 1978)-which later appeared in
an edited volume on human ethology (von
Cranach, Foppa, Lepenies, and Ploog 1979) and
then was included in Goffman's Forms of Talk
(1981). However, Goffman does not refer to or
mention Frame Analysis anywhere in that paper.

Habermas's discussion of validity claims and
the rationality assumptions underlying communicative action.

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, RATIONALITY, AND VALIDITY CLAIMS
To reiterate, Habermas is concerned first and
foremost with an analytical program that,
through the generative assumptions of universalizable ethics (norms) and social actors'
capacity for moral reasoning and rationality
(Benhabib 1992:24), attempts to delineate
criteria for and the possibility for noncoerced, or communicative, action. The problem of rationality is thus reintroduced in
Habermas insofar as the conditions for such
a communicatively achieved, reasonable
consensus among actors must be grounded
in the possibility of actors' communicative
rationality, this being "the competency to argue and the imperative of responsibility
[through language]" (Hinkle 1992:317; also
see Hayim 1992).
Habermas's attempt to designate criteria
for noncoerced, or communicative, action
hinges on the explication of three validity
claims that represent the binding force of
communicative acts. A speaker raises all of
the following validity claims with his or her
utterances, as every speech act could be contested on the following grounds:
(1) Hearer can contest the normative rightness of the utterance (social world).
(2) Hearer can contest the subjective truthfulness of the utterance (subjective
world).
(3) Hearer can deny that certain existential
presuppositions obtain (objective world).
Habermas (1984) offers the following example to illustrate these validity claims:
A seminar student understands the following
request by a professor: "Please bring me a glass
of water." (P. 306)
As this is not a simple imperative or sheer
expression of will, but a speech act carried
out in an "attitude oriented to understanding," the student may contest its validity with
the following responses:
(1) No. You can't treat me like one of your
employees [contesting the normative rightness of the utterance].

(2) No. You really only want to put me in a
bad light in front of the other seminar participants [contesting the subjective truthfulness of the utterance].
(3) No. The next water tap is so far away that I
couldn't get back before the end of the session [denying that the appropriate objective
conditions obtain]. (Habermas 1984:306;
comments in brackets added by author)
The student is, in the first case, contesting
the action of the professor; in the second,
contesting that the professor means what he
says; in the third, denying the truth of propositions the professor has presupposed in the
given situation. This holds, according to
Habermas, for all speech acts oriented to
reaching understanding.
Habermas attempts to somehow find a way
to institute the binding normative (moral)
conditions obtaining in the "ideal speech
situation" across the entire societal community. He admits that this is, at present, a
purely utopian goal, as he is unable to locate
instances of communicative action at the institutional level within modern, Western society (see Sciulli 1989, 1992a, 1992b). It is,
first and foremost, the problem of modernity,
what Habermas refers to as the shearing off
of system from the lifeworld. 12 But unlike
many critics of modernity, Habermas is unwilling to reject the project of Enlightenment, which he construes as the quest for the
rational foundations of a critical sociology.
This quest is, I believe, worthwhile and important, and hence my concern is to help
reach this goal by attempting to link Habermas's analytical theory of communicative
action to the empirical social world. In a
somewhat more critical vein, I suggest that
Habermas must take more seriously Goff12 In attempting to complete the project of modernity, Habermas knows full well the sorts of
social pathologies that must be addressed to defend modernity against recent post modern
(meta)critiques (especially those of Lyotard, Foucault and BaudriIlard). Habermas' s "shearing off
of the Iifeworld" equates to a concern with the
deleterious effects of instrumental rationality on
the everyday social world (lifeworld). The ongoing rationalization of society has caused a split
between system and Iifeworld. This implies two
forms of societal integration: (\) The Iifeworld is
integrated by communicative action, whereby actors work to achieve consensus through language;

man's (1959, 1981, 1983a, 1983b) insights
into the forms of talk that occur in the general context of human communication forged
through simple co-presence (i.e., the "interaction order").
BRINGING GOFFMAN BACK IN
Habermas's concern with the problem of curtailed communication, and of communication
more generally, is shared by Goffman. That
is, like Habermas, Goffman spent his entire
career investigating communicative action or
conduct, but from an empirical or ethnographic perspective, not an overtly analytical
one. In his dissertation, "Communication
Conduct in an Island Community," Goffman
(1953) explains, "As the study progressed,
conversational interaction came to be seen as
one species of social order" (p. 1). And later,
citing Parsons (1951) and Barnard (1947),
Goffman lays out the fundamental assumption underlying his sociological model of
communication: "I assume that conversational interaction between concrete persons
who are in each other's immediate presence
is a species of social order and can be studied by applying the model of social order to
it" (p. 33).
Whereas Habermas's rationality assumptions are explicitly stated as three validity
claims, the assumption of rationality is only
implicit in Goffman, as Parsons and others
had already worked out sophisticated schemata to explain the place of rationality in social order, or rather, in the "constitution" of
social actors operating within the social system. The closest Goffman ever comes to directly dealing with the rationality problem is
through his theory of normal appearances
(2) at the systems level, functional integration intertwines action with their consequences. The latter form of integration is guided by the
"objectivating attitude," the former by the
"performative attitude." Because abstract and
generalized criteria are encompassed in many facets of life (e.g., legal norms, economic action, the
norm of cognitive rationality), the "system" may
be seen as operating with a life of its own, with
little or no reference to the actual activity of participants of the lifeworld. This system domination
occurs through the ongoing rationalization (or
what Habermas calls the "colonization") of the
lifeworld.

(see Goffman 1971). That is, per the dramaturgical theory of action, social actors
learn-first through socialization and then
through imitation and experience-the tacit
cultural codes signaling an actor's proper demeanor while in the presence of others.
Goffman's actor can thus modify presentations of self appropriately to "fit" any particular interaction episode so as to signal to
those present that he or she is a reasoned or
"rational" actor (i.e., that he or she is a ratified participant in the social proceedings,
that he or she belongs there, that he or she is
not "crazy" or deranged, that he or she is not
a threat). An actor's minimum requirements
for maintaining normal appearances through
the display of his or her verbal and/or nonverbal actions means that no undue alarm is
signaled to others present.
Goffman and Habermas part company on
the epistemological assumptions embedded
within each of their theories that pertain to
each theorist's ability to conceptualize what
is going on in the minds of social actors; call
it the problem of Verstehen, or phenomenological "intersubjectivity," or more generally,
subjective understanding. Habermas, in
viewing dramaturgical action, operates explicitly with a "black box" concept of action
(to be discussed more fully below). Goffman
however rejects this position in his own theories. For Goffman, Habermas's view of communication is overly rationalistic. To understand this divergence, we turn to Goffman's
Frame Analysis (1974), specifically his discussion of the "Frame Analysis of Talk."

Goffman's Frame Analysis of Talk
The one thing that makes the idea of communicative action possible is that, using language, disparate actors can reach consensus
on issues at hand. Goffman's idea of linguistic competence is close to Habermas's: Individuals in the presence of others possess cultural competence in that they are generally
able to avoid misunderstandings in their everyday communication. (Notice though, for
example, the "cute mistakes" that children
are allowed in their speech; they are assumed
to lack a fully developed communicative
competence. ) Goffman discusses conversation-the traditional view of which "assumes
an easy exchange of speaker-hearer role

[whereby participants are] engaged in a consummatory moment" (Goffman 1974:498)merely as a foil. Habermas shares this traditional, hyperrational view of conversation,
and as a consequence tends to gloss over the
actual social context of talk, which, I would
suggest, Goffman has successfully incorporated. In other words, Habermas needs Goffman's fuller communication paradigm to
flesh out his own theory of communicative
action.
From Goffman's perspective, all utterances, whether formal or informal, regulative,
expressive, constative, directive, commissive,
or declarative-are first and foremost anchored in the surrounding world. 13 As he
(Goffman 1974:500) states, "utterances take
up a place in the world"; they are, following
Durkheim, "social facts." Utterances produce
reactions or orientations of actors, thereby
contributing to the production of an ongoing
social world. Most important from the perspective of dramaturgy, talk is always a
project imbued with "structured suspense"
(Goffman 1974:506).
Suspense in talk implies that "we spend
most of our time not engaged in giving information but in giving shows" (Goffman 1974:
508). The implications for Habermas's
project are staggering. Habermas's theory is
driven by an information paradigm. That is,
social life is more or less a continuous battle
over the status, the validity, the appropriateness, the truthfulness, of knowledge claimsthe problem of information exchange and
transfer drives Habermas's theory. But for
Goffman, talk constitutes not only bald statements of fact; talk is also about recounting,
about "story-telling." Much of talk consists
of replayings in which a storyteller maintains
the listeners' suspense. This suspense provides frames for the organization of talk.
The purely informational perspective
(Habermas) leads, in Goffman's view, to an
unacceptably utilitarian view of talk or communication. The "rational recounting" of
13 As Collins and Makowsky (1993:268) note,
Habermas attaches one particular type of speech
act, namely expressives, to Goffman's dramaturgical theory of action in that for Habermas, actors represent (or can misrepresent) their subjective states or inner selves to others through dramatic presentation.

facts between participants in communication
implies the black-box model of interactants
(Goffman 1974:511). Furthermore, continues
GOffman, "this utilitarianlike approach to
speech ill equips us for what individuals actually do during speaking" (p. 512). The
black-box model of information exchange is
a simplification because in actuality the "insides of the actor's head are exposed in ways
other than through voluntary statements or
involuntary leakage" (p. 514). Going beyond
the black-box model, Goffman (1974:515)
gives examples of non utilitarian talk such as
"collusive communication," whereby one can
"conceal speech behind speech" by conveying information via sarcasm, irony, innuendo, or simple fun. Habermas deals somewhat inadequately with the collusive frame,
and would tend to write it off as strategic action, which, in any case, would not meet his
standards for communicative action.
Goffman (1974) suggests that the "traditional model of the actor whose facial features are his evidential boundary does not fit
the facts but instead somehow overrationalizes man" (p. SIS). However, notice that an
actor may guide his or her behavior to fit the
black-box model-to align with normative
strictures of the perceived moral universe: In
Goffman's (1974) words, "he has guided his
conduct so as to ensure this fit, sustaining a
human nature to fit the frame" (p. 516). This
is Goffman's "normal appearances," which
Habermas mistakes for first-level rational action. Goffman illustrates the complexity, the
frame-within-a-frame possibilities, of reasoned communication.
Additionally, Habermas says very little
about what Goffman refers to as the "ritual
frame of talk." This is when listener provides
to speaker an intermittent stream of supportive gestures: "uh-huhs," "yeahs," nods of the
head, sustaining eye contact so as to signal
interest in the talk, and so forth. This ritual
frame reflects the accommodating pattern of
face-to-face interaction. The speaker, of
course, also plays a role in accommodation,
as the "life of talk consists principally of reliving," or replaying, sustained by suspense
(Goffman 1974:547). In other words, naked
performative utterances, such as a bridge
player's bid of "three clubs," are only a minuscule element of the frame of talk. What is
important, especially if we are to link Haber-

mas's theory to the empirical social world, is
that in talk a person always frames him- or
herself from view. An important quote from
Goffman (1974) illustrates this point:
To say that he [the speaker] assumes a role and
presents himself through it is already a bias in
the direction of wholeness and authenticity.
What he does is to present a one-man show. He
animates. (P. 547)
This animation is the speaker's agency, his
or her "doing of the moment." There often
are, as Habermas has rightly noted, true feelings and attitudes expressed in talk, and inner states can be documented (the famous
black-box). "But," as Goffman (1974) suggests, "these displays are not some privileged
access to the biological innards of the
speaker, for they are properly to be attributed
to a figure animated, not the animator" (p.
547). This is Goffman's (1983b) notion of
"loose coupling," the difference between the
mythic and the performance text-or the
slippages that occur between social structure
and individual human acts.
Goffman (1974) makes this extremely important point: "Everyday life, which is real
enough in itself, often seems to be a laminated adumbration of a pattern or model that
is itself a typification of quite uncertain
realm status" (p. 562). This is what Garfinkel
(1967) and others have described as the "perceived moral universe," the normative view
of the world that individual actors carry
around in their heads, or what Durkheim refers to as the "collective conscience." From
Goffman's perspective, everyday activity
provides an original against which copies can
be struck.

Attempting to Reconcile Goffman and
Habermas
As we have seen, Habermas's goal is to outline a research program for a universal pragmatics that identifies and reconstructs the
universal conditions of possible understanding between actors. This goal, of course,
turned Habermas's attention toward the
realm of "practical discourse," and to specify
the criteria or conditions for possible noncoerced action, this practical discourse must be
aimed at "understanding" rather than at
"success ."

For Habermas then, "success" is an overly
strategic orientation that often overrides the
more crucial goal of "understanding" in action or communication. What Goffman's observations on talk help us see, however, is
that Habermas's distinction between "success" and "understanding" in talk is an overspecification of a process that may be impervious, at least at this time, to the sort of analytical fine-tuning Habermas seeks. Granted,
persons often "put on shows" in talk, they
may attempt to deceive, and there are often
calculated shifts in the alignment of speakers and hearers (what Goffman calls shifts in
"footing") as the context of the talk dictates
(Goffman 1981: 127). But much of this seemingly "strategic" action is not necessarily oriented to success, that is, a speaker's instrumental attempt to achieve some goal at the
expense of his or her audience (see Rawls
1987:143-44). In fact speakers do indeed attempt to achieve understanding through
talk-Habermas's communicative actionand they utilize the props, mechanisms, and
processes that Habermas erroneously condemns as evidence of a speaker's strategic or
coercive intent. 14
Much of the content of talk is, as Goffman
shows, suffused with the very human attempt
to illustrate to others through speaker's talk
the presence of a stable, concerted self (see
my discussion of the "negational self' [Chriss
forthcoming]). In other words, everyday life
is guided by fictive or romanticized ideals
(norms) about the way life ought to be conducted. We learn to comport ourselves to render our activities as agreeable to others, and
to show through our presentations that we
have a consistent, stable persona to which our
identity is connected. As Goffman (1974)
suggests, "Indeed, in countless ways and
ceaselessly, social life takes up and freezes
14 Collins and Makowsky (1993) make much
the same point, suggesting that Habermas seems
to view Goffman's theory as concerned primarily
with the ways that actors express or conceal subjective states before a group of others. But, as I
argue here, this view of Goffman is overly narrow. Rather, "The self may be a 'sacred object'
to which we give ritual respect, but by the same
token it is also a modern myth which actually
fluctuates with the footings one takes in different
levels of social interaction" (Collins and Makowsky 1993:270; also Chriss 1993).

into itself the understandings we have of it"
(p.563).
It is no wonder, then, that Goffman dedicated so much of his professional energies to
mapping out where, how, and to what extent
"real" life becomes theatrics or even downright deception. In effect, Habermas's analytical program attempts to pick up from
Goffman's (and before him, Bateson's
[1972]) starting point by suggesting that
there is a way to make such a distinction, this
being the distinction between authentic (noncoerced) and inauthentic (coerced or staged)
communication.
The problem of communicative action, understood in this way, leads us to consider the
following from Goffman (1974):
Life may not be an imitation of art, but ordinary conduct, in a sense, is an imitation of the
proprieties, a gesture at the exemplary forms,
and the primal realization of these ideals belongs more to make-believe than to reality. (P.
562)

Persons in talk, according to Goffman, always walk a tightrope along the reality/makebelieve continuum, not because there is necessarily some devious or underhanded reason
for doing so, but because of the inherently
tenuous and shifting positions speakers occupy while talking. Goffman's (1981:147)
idea of "embedding" suggests just this; that
as speakers we represent ourselves through
the personal pronoun "I." As speakers we are
a figure in a statement, a protagonist in a dramatic event told (or retold).
When we refer to ourselves in talk, we
necessarily speak of someone who inhabits
the world that is spoken about, not necessarily the world of current talk. It is first and
foremost a knowledge claim, but not in the
way Habermas would designate. That is, the
referencing of self in talk through use of the
personal pronoun allows for a tremendous
flexibility of presentationes) of self before an
audience (Bell 1984). In effect, we each have
at our disposal a wide array of naturally occurring dramatic personae from which to
draw in normal everyday speech, and this is
not alarming. IS
15 For example, "hedges" and "qualifiers," in
the form of performative modal verbs (e.g., I
"wish," "think," "could," "hope," etc.) introduce
distance between a speaker's figure and its
avowal (Goffman 1981: 148).

But in modern industrial societies, burgeoning populations and increased levels of
anonymity are a feature of everyday interaction. In this environment, the increased flexibility and decreased accountability of selfpresentations may indeed contribute to the
rise of a whole new range of framing debates, such as the imbroglios which have
erupted recently over abortion, speech codes,
or even sexual harassment. This particular
line of investigation cannot be pursued further here because it would take us too far
afield (but see Chriss 1994b; Horowitz 1993;
Wiley 1994). I emphasize, however, that
conceptualizations of the self, and especially
the question of the sincerity of the presented
self (see Tseelon 1992a), are central issues
in the theory of communicative action.

ISSUES OF ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
In summarizing my thoughts on Habermas,
Goffman, and communicative action, I return
now to issues of organizations and professional practice-consulting, management,
evaluation, and planning. One of the areas in
which sociologists can claim a degree of
competence is social interaction, or more
specifically, face-to-face behavior. For example, students or disciples of Goffman may
choose to follow his lead regarding the observation and understanding of face-to-face
interaction in naturalistic settings. For researchers so inclined, the dramaturgical
theory of action provides a general framework for describing, analyzing, assessing, or
explicating concrete instances of such talk in
any number of settings, be it a party, an office meeting, a therapy group session, a service transaction, a chess match, a wargarners convention, or what have you.
Several years ago I spent the summer
working for a large philanthropic foundation.
I was hired to conduct a meta-evaluation of
the foundation's evaluation research unit.
Because the foundation prided itself on having a "flat" organizational hierarchy, I generally had free access to all departmental and
management meetings as well as to key organizational actors, such as the executive director and the heads of the various departments (these being religion, culture, education, policy analysis, international affairs,

communications, and evaluation). Through
both formal and informal discussions with
employees of the foundation, it became apparent to many of them that Goffman's work
was central to my own understanding and interpretation of social behavior.
Within two weeks of my arrival, I sensed a
growing uneasiness, and even suspicion,
among many at the foundation. Much of this
had to do, I believe, with Goffman's reputation for turning a jaundiced eye toward organizations, and organizational actors more
generally, as evidenced by his infamous
expose of "total institutions" reported in Asylums (1961 a). What I suggest is that many in
organizations or organizational studies seem
to have a one-sided or incomplete view of
Goffman's theory-one that views him as
overtly concerned with exposing the dark underbel\y or the "crawlspaces" of organizations. 16
Ingram (1986) perhaps best typifies this
particular sentiment; he suggests that the notion of organizational "underlife" was first
proposed by Goffman (1961 a). According to
Ingram's reading of Goffman, the underlife
of an organization is composed of organizational members who, while maintaining a
level of organizational identification and appearing to fulfil\ organizational roles, engage
in behaviors that violate organizational expectations and yield unauthorized rewards.
The crawlspace of an organization, then, is
the structure of arrangements that support or
even promote underlife existence.
Confronted with this rather negative assessment of Goffman at the foundation, or
rather, confronted with the abiding contention that Goffman has little to offer in the
way of explicating organizational behavior,
my next step was to determine what literature or traditions of thought guided the dayto-day theories-in-use of these professional
16 There may also exist within organizations
high levels of skepticism toward intellectuals or
academicians in general, regardless of their theoretical or philosophical orientation, especially
those who are not well known to members of the
organization. Kanter's (1977) fieldwork appears
to confirm this atmosphere of anti-intellectualism
in formal organizations: "Emphasis was placed
on getting along, 'keeping your nose clean,' and
on having a smooth interpersonal style. Introspection was out. Intellectuals were suspect" (p. 41).

practitioners, especial\y the evaluators and
consultants at the foundation with whom I
had regular contact. 17
As we saw in an earlier section, a sizable
portion of the research tradition guiding organizational evaluators and consultants is
represented by Argyris's (1993a, 1993b;
Argyris and Schon 1974, 1989) and Schon's
(1983) "action research." This tradition is in
turn derived from Lewin's (1943, 1951) research on smal\ groups, and it is important
to note here the major aims of Lewin's
project. As a (psychological) social psychologist, Lewin was attempting to establish
in systematic fashion the links between an
individual's behavior and attitudes and certain characteristics of groups; he devoted attention to the spatial and temporal characteristics determining group stability or change.
Lewin's work was original\y formulated
within the context of problems communities
typically face with regard to attitude change,
loyalty, and in-group/out-group relations.
What emerges, then, from this brief review
of Lewin's program is the realization that
Lewin was not satisfied merely to document
or describe the vagaries of face-to-face behavior or group life; his primary goal was to
understand and establish the conditions under which attitude change could be affected
or facilitated. As Back (1981) explains,
The kind of group that emerges from [Lewin's]
model is one that has meaning for the members
and that is especially effective in producing or
preventing attitude change in its members. The
17 I am not implying here that Ingram's own
assessment of Goffman is negative. Ingram simply points out that Goffman's work in Asylums
was important and influential primarily because
it documented the ways persons cope in the face
of the stringent demands of a coercive organizational or social structure. An underlife then becomes a survival tactic, a way of shoring up or
saving identities under siege. But academics or
consultants who go into organizations with the
intent of observing organizational behavior and
who are known to be sympathetic to Goffman's
approach may be seen by organizational actors as
carrying with them an implicit assumption of the
coercive nature of organizations. This, then, explains the source of suspicion and negative assessments of the research observer (and of
Goffman) by organizations or their representatives.

model thus examines the conditions under
which members change and begin to exhibit attitudes and beliefs similar to the group, or to
act in a similar way .... Lewin's interest was
in investigating conditions that could produce
attitude and habit changes. (Pp. 330-31)

This instrumentalist, therapeutic impulse
of Lewin's work was carried over into the
tradition of organizational behavior (OB), in
which the aim of research is to help organizations influence change, presumably for the
better. Argyris's action research (1993a,
1993b) is one such program in the applied
social psychology of organizations. IS
Argyris and Schon (1974) tend to view
Goffman's characterization of social actors
(especially his position on impression management and the presentation of self) as a fair
approximation of the naturally occurring but
ultimately destructive tendencies toward selfsealing, defensive, and insincere behavior.
This naturally occurring Model I behavior
could, according to action research, be overcome through a program that heightens organizational actors' self-realizations-that
is, a program that brings actors' espoused
theories more into line with their actual theories-in-use. And through this change of attitudes or behaviors, organizational learning
could thereby be advanced.
Habermas's program is also based on an
ameliorative plan, namely the effort to assure
reasoned or noncoerced communication in
the face of multiple organizational structures
supporting inequality and differential power
that serve to cut off the possibility of consensus or intersubjective understanding
through fair discussion or argumentation.
But unlike Lewin's program or the program
of action research, Habermas does not see
Goffman's dramaturgical theory of action as
representing some fundamental, albeit
flawed, description of the human condition
that could somehow be overcome through a
critical program of attitude change or self-realization. This is because Goffman's dramaturgy cannot assure intersubjective understanding between actors because, in
Habermas's view, it has no way of providing
18 Lewin's work was also influential in the development of the organizational development
(OD) model of attitude or behavior change (see
Aguinis 1993; Marshak 1993).

access to the social (normative) world, one
of Habermas's three key analytical worlds
(the others being the objective and subjective
worlds). In other words, communicative action can be realized only if social actors have
free and undistorted access to the three validity claims of propositional truth, normative rightness, and subjective truthfulness.
CONCLUSION
How has Habermas's ameliorative program
of communicative action been received in the
literature on organizations and professions,
and how does it compare to the reception of
Goffman's work? It is safe to say that
Habermas's work, and critical theory more
generally, has been much more influential
and more seriously discussed in these fields
than has Goffman's work. 19 A good example
of this is Holmes's (1992) paper, entitled
"The Drama of Nursing." In the recent literature on organizations and the professions,
much has been made of conceiving of professions as a form of aesthetic praxis, the
goal being to provide a more stable analytical foundation for the concept "profession"
through the identification and linking of
these so-called performative practices to the
concept itself. Holmes's (1992) contrast between Goffman and critical theory is instructive for our discussion:
In contrast to Goffman's dramaturgy, which
stresses the artifice of social relations and suggests a cynical view of human interactions, a
critical theory of dramatic praxis introduces a
normative dimension in which performance
may become self-realizing and emancipatory as
it aspires to the status of aesthetic practice.
Conceived in such terms, nursing practice becomes a powerful form of self-expression
which has the potential to become liberating
for the nurse and the patient. (P. 941)

Holmes's insistence that critical theory
adds a normative dimension to the understanding of actors' performances points to
the same failings of the dramaturgical model
identified earlier by Habermas, namely that
Goffman's theory of action cannot explain
19 See for example Burrell's (1994) overview
of Habermas's contribution to organizational
analysis.

why actors would ever engage, or choose to
engage, in norm-conformative behavior. 2o
Again, it should be pointed out that this
incongruity between critical theory and
Goffman's theory on the issue of actors' access to the validity claim that assures, or at
least makes possible, appropriate social relations and normative rightness, evolves
from a disagreement over the ontology of
self-presentation and impression management. I have already discussed at some
length Goffman's position and my own defense of him on this issue, and the reasons
for this disagreement should now be clear.
In the final analysis, the contention between
Habermas and Goffman comes down to a
fundamental question: Is the presented self a
sincere self? As I suggested in my attempt
to reconcile the views of Goffman and
Habermas (pp. 13-14), Tseelon (l992a,
20 For an even more explicit treatment of
Habermas's importance to nursing practice, see
Porter (1994). Even given this preference for
Habermas or critical theory over Goffman among
authors concerned with issues of professional
practice, Habermas's program is nevertheless
viewed by many as overly abstract and hopelessly
detached from the empirical social world.
Robinson's (1994) discussion of Habermas with
respect to the field of education and pedagogy is
iIIustrati ve of this sentiment: "[Habermas' sl work
does not provide a methodology that is applicable
to the conduct or evaluation of dialogical practice. Habermas's theory of communicative action
is concerned to defend an ideal of rationality,
founded in the universal presuppositions of
speech, and this ideal cannot be directly applied
to everyday situations" (p. 72). What we need,
suggests authors such as Robinson (1994),
Frankford (1994), and Young (1989), is a way to
move from Habermas's "universal pragmatics" to
an "empirical pragmatics," the latter referring to
the study of actual utterances that occur in specific social contexts. Given this emphasis on
empiricizing actual speech in concrete settings, it
is interesting that Goffman's work in this area
(e.g., 1971, 1974, 1981, 1983a) has been largely
ignored. Finally, in offering suggestions for possible resources for pursuing such a critical inquiry, Robinson (1994) points to Argyris's
(1993a, 1993b; Argyris and Schon 1974) action
research: "The work of Argyris offers a normative theory which is compatible with the value
base of critical theory and which incorporates a
methodology by which it can be applied to dialogical sequences" (p. 72).

1992b) goes a long way toward answering
this question. 21 Tseelon (l992a) argues that
the tradition known as impression management (1M) (see Arkin 1980; Schlenker 1980;
Tedeschi 1981; Tedeschi and Melburg
1984), although rooted in Goffman's (1959)
seminal work on the presentation of self,
has veered away from Goffman's original
intent in a number of crucial ways. Most important, whereas Goffman's idea of
"frontstage" and "backstage" attempted
merely to illustrate how selves can be partitioned in terms of self-presentations before
a variety of audiences, 1M's interpretation
of this partitioning is that individuals possess distinctively "true" private selves and
distinctively "false" public selves. 22 Goffman's actor puts on a variety of faces in
various settings and before particular audiences in an effort to comport him- or herself
to the exigencies of the social gathering and
to uphold the definition of the situation.
1M's social actor, on the other hand, has a
hidden agenda as he or she goes about the
business of presenting the self; there is always a concerted effort to keep a private reality from surfacing during any particular
public presentation.
Tseelon (1992a) explains the disjunction
between the Goffman tradition and 1M as follows:
The Goffmanesque approach views people's
presentational behaviour as a process of negotiation. It is a game of representation. In contrast, the position advanced by 1M researchers
views presentational behaviour as manipulative. According to this view people present
various images of themselves as a strategic
21 Welsh (1984) argues that the presented self
is a product of a capitalist society which places a
premium on appearances. That is, because bureaucratic actors are constantly monitored and assessed with regard to their job performance and
effectiveness, this fetish of appearance has given
rise to an overweening emphasis on impression
management on the part of these actors (also see
Willmott 1993). This view of the actor is closer
to impression managements's, and even Habermas's, more cynical view of the actor as a savvy
manipulator concerned merely with working the
system for the enhancement of self.
22 For useful discussions of the divergence of
Goffman and 1M within the context of organizational behavior, see Giacalone and Beard (1994)
and Rosenfeld, Giacalone, and Riordan (1994).

move. Unlike Goffman's approach, this 'game'
is not an end in itself but a means to an end of
gaining benefits. It is a game of misrepresentation. (P. 116)
It is my contention that Habermas, as well
as many researchers working on therapeutic
approaches to improving communication and
interaction practices in professions or organizations, tend to make the mistake of lumping together Goffman's work and that of 1M.
What Habermas and many other astute social
thinkers have failed to understand clearly is
that, although all deceptive presentations are
staged, not all staged presentations are deceptive or geared toward obfuscation or distortion.
The theory of communicative action, then,
must address two difficult and interrelated
issues-one ontological, one epistemological-if it is to advance any further. With respect to ontology, the theory must specify
more concretely the nature of impression
management, or rather, it must be able to answer the question, to what extent is the presented self a naturally occurring aspect of
human interaction? With respect to epistemology, the theory must be able to address
the question, how are we to know the aims
or intent of the presented self? And knowing
this, how then can we reconcile the realities
of impression management with the potential
for communicative action contained in the
analytic of the presented self?
These and others issues point the way toward a continuing refinement of the theory
of communicative action and reaffirm the
important role that Goffman's dramaturgical
theory of action can play in achieving this
end. Most significantly, the achievement of
such an empirically-grounded theory of communicative action holds the potential for ushering in a new era in applied sociology, especially with respect to the study and explication of organizational behavior and communication.
In fact, I envision a refinement of the
Habermas-Goffman communicative action
schema which could eventually serve as the
basis for a clinical sociology practice. This
professional practice would involve helping
people, groups, or organizations that are having difficulty-communicative or otherwise-in their daily relationships. This

would not be a counseling service per se, as
would be typical of social work or psychotherapeutic practice (see Kubacki 1994), but
would involve applying the skills of
Verstehen to everyday situations, stressing
the social or cultural factors, rather than the
individual, psychological, or symptomological factors, implicated in such disturbances. I hope to develop and present this
applied schema in a future work.
James J. Chriss recently completed his Ph.D. in
sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. His
main areas of interest. are sociological theory.
criminology. and organizational behavior. His
current projects include a study of how males and
females differ in their attitudes toward participation in popular dance. the sociology of consulting in organizations. embezzlement as an ongoing practical accomplishment. and getting Erving
Gofftnan's dissertation published.

REFERENCES
Adorno, T. W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik. Daniel J.
Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. The
Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper
and Brothers.
Agger, Ben. 1992. The Discourse of Domination:
From the Frankfurt School to Postmodernism.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Aguinis, Herman. 1993. "Action Research and
Scientific Method: Presumed Discrepancies
and Actual Similarities." Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science 29:416-31.
Argyris, Chris. 1993a. On Organizational Learning. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- - - . 1993b. Knowledge for Action. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, Chris, Robert Putnam, and Diana McLain Smith. 1985. Action Science. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Argyris, Chris and Donald A. Schon. 1974.
Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional
Effectiveness. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- - - . 1989. "Participatory Action Research and
Action Science Compared." American Behavioral Scientist 32:612-23.
Arkin, Robert M. 1980. "Self-Presentation." Pp.
158-82 in The Self in Social Psychology, edited by D. M. Wegner and R. M. Vallacher. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Back, Kurt W. 1981. "Small Groups." Pp. 32043 in Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives, edited by M. Rosenberg and R. H. Turner. New York: Basic Books.
Baldamus, Willhelm. 1992. "Understanding
Habermas's Methods of Reasoning." History of

the Human Sciences 5:97-115.

Barnard, Chester I. 1947. The Functions of the
Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bateson, Gregory. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of
Mind. New York: Ballantine.
Bell, Allan. 1984. "Language Style as Audience
Design." Language in Society 13: 145-204.
Benhabib, Seyla. 1992. Situating the Self' Gen-

der, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. New York: Routledge.
Bottomore, Tom. 1984. The Frankfurt School.

London, England: Tavistock.
Burrell, Gibson. 1994. "Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis 4: The Contribution of Jurgen Habermas." Organization

Studies 15:1-19.

Chriss, James J. 1992. "Habermas and Goffman:
Some Suggestions for Future Research." Per-

spectives: The Theory Section Newsletter 15:6.

- - - . 1993. "Durkheim' s Cult of the Individual
as Civil Religion: Its Appropriation by Erving
Goffman." Sociological Spectrum 13:251-75.
- - - . 1994a. "Goffman, Parsons, and Contemporary Sociology: Working towards Integration." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
- - . 1994b. "Spain on Status and Space: A
Comment." Sociological Theory 12:106-109.
- - - . Forthcoming. "Role Distance and the Negational Self." In Goffman's Patrimony, edited
by G. W. H. Smith. London, England: Routledge.
Collins, Randall and Michael Makowsky. 1993.
The Discovery of Society. 5th ed. New York:
McGraw-HilI.
Cooke, Maeve. 1994. Language and Reason: A
Study of Habermas's Pragmatics. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Dahl, Goran. 1995. "Critique, Conservatism, Ideology: The Frankfurt School's Critique of the
Sociology of Knowledge Revisited." Pp. 15579 in Current Perspectives in Social Theory,
vol. 15, edited by B. Agger. Greenwich, CT:
JAI Press.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1958. "Out of Utopia: Toward
a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis."
American Journal of Sociology 64: 115-27.
Felts, Arthur A. 1992. "Organizational Communication: A Critical Perspective." Administra-

tion and Society 23:495-513.

Forester, John. 1989. Planning in the Face of
Power. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
- - . 1992. "Critical Ethnography: On Fieldwork in a Habermasian Way." Pp. 46-65 in
Critical Management Studies, edited by M.
Alvesson and H. Willmott. London, England:
Sage.

Frankford, David M. 1994."The Critical Potential
of the Common Law Tradition" (Review Essay
of David Sciulli's Theory of Societal Constitutionalism). Columbia Law Review 94: 1076123.
Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Giacalone, Robert A. and Jon W. Beard. 1994.
"Impression Management, Diversity, and International Management." American Behavioral

Scientist 37:621-36.

Goffman, Erving. 1953. "Communication Conduct in an Island Community." Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sociology, University of
Chicago, Chicago, IL.
- - - . 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday Anchor.
- - - . 1961a. Asylums: Essays on the Social

Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.
- - - . 1961b. Encounters: Two Studies in the
Sociology of Interaction. Indianapolis, IN:

Bobbs-Merri II.
- - - . 1963a. Behavior in Public Places: Notes
on the Social Organization of Gatherings. New
York: Free Press.
- - - . 1963b. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
- - - . 1967. Interaction Ritual: Essays on
Face-to-Face Behavior. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday Anchor.
---.1969. Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia,
PA: University of Philadelphia Press.
- - - . 1971. Relations in Public: Microstudies
of the Public Order. New York: Basic Books.
- - - . 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the
Organization of Experience. Boston, MA:
Northeastern University Press.
- - - . 1978. "Response Cries." Language 54:
787-815.
- - . 1981. Forms of Talk. Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
- - - . 1983a. "Felicity's Condition." American
Journal of Sociology 89: I-53.
- - - . 1983b. "The Interaction Order." American Sociological Review 48: 1-17.
Gouldner, Alvin W. 1970. The Coming Crisis of
Western Sociology. New York: Basic Books.
Grice, H. P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." Pp.
64-75 in The Logic of Grammar, edited by D.
Davidson and G. Harman. Encino, CA:
Dickenson.
Habermas, Jurgen. 1971. Knowledge and Human
Interests. Translated from German by J. 1.
Shapiro. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- - - . 1975. Legitimation Crisis. Translated
from German by T. McCarthy. Boston, MA:
Beacon Press.
- - - . 1979. "Comments on Papers by Ekman

and Goffman." Pp. 241-45 in Human Ethology: Claims and Limits of a New Discipline,
edited by M. von Cranach, K. Foppa, W.
Lepenies, and D. Ploog. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
- - - . 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1. Translated from German by T.
McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- - - . 1987. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Translated from German by T.
McCarthy. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Hakel, Milton D. 1994. "The Past, Present, and
Future of OB Applications by Consulting Academicians." Pp. 275-87 in Organizational Behavior: The State of the Science, edited by J.
Greenberg. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hayim, Gila J. 1992. "Naturalism and the Crisis
of Rationalism in Habermas." Social Theory
and Practice 18: 187-209.
Hinkle, Gisela J. 1992. "Habermas, Mead,. and
Rationality." Symbolic Interaction 15:315-31.
Holmes, Colin A. 1992. "The Drama of Nursing."
Journal of Advanced Nursing 17:941-50.
Horowitz, Irving L. 1993. The Decomposition of
Sociology. New York: Oxford University
Press.
House, Robert, Denise M. Rousseau, and Melissa
Thomas-Hunt. 1995. "The Meso Paradigm: A
Framework for the Integration of Micro and
Macro Organizational Behavior." Pp. 71-114
in Research in Organizational Behavior, vol.
17, edited by L. L. Cummings and B. M. Staw.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Ingram, Larry C. 1986. "In the Crawlspace of the
Organization." Human Relations 39: 157-86.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Men and Women
of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books.
Kincheloe, Joe L. and Peter L. McLaren. 1994.
"Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative
Research." Pp. 138-57 in Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by N. K. Denzin and Y.
S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Kingwell, Mark. 1993. "Is It Rational to Be Polite?" Journal of Philosophy 90:387-404.
Kubacki, Steven R. 1994."Applying Habermas's
Theory of Communicative Action to Values in
Psychotherapy." Psychotherapy 31 :463-77.
Ledoux, Yves. 1981. "Theorie critique et recherche-action: I' heritage habermassien" (Critical
Theory and Action Research: The Habermasian
Heritage). Revue de I' Institut de Sociologie
3:623-35.
Lewin, Kurt. 1943. "Defining 'The Field of a
Given Time. "'Psychological Review 50:292310.
- - - . 1951. Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical Papers. New York: Harper.
Lidz, Victor M. 1986. "Parsons and Empirical
Sociology." Pp. 141-82 in The Nationalization
of the Social Sciences, edited by S. Z. Klausner

and V. M. Lidz. Philadelphia, PA: University
of Pennsylvania Press.
Marshak, Robert J. 1993. "Lewin Meets Confucius: A Re- View of the OD Model of
Change." Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 29:393-415.
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. London, England: Oxford University
Press.
Munch, Richard. 1993. Sociological Theory. Vol
2. Chicago, IL:Nelson-Hall.
Parsons, Talcott. 1937. The Structure of Social
Action. New York: Free Press.
---.1951. The Social System. New York: Free
Press.
- - - . 1978. Action Theory and the Human
Condition. New York: Free Press.
Porter, Sam. 1994. "New Nursing: The Road to
Freedom?" Journal of Advanced Nursing
20:269-74.
Rawls, Anne W. 1987. "The Interaction Order Sui
Generis: Goffman~s Contribution to Social
Theory." Sociological Theory 5: 136-49.
Robinson, Viviane M. J. 1994. "The Practical
Promise of Critical Research in Educational
Administration." Educational Administration
Quarterly 30:56-76.
Rosenfeld, Paul, Robert A. Giacalone, and
Catherine A. Riordan. 1994. "Impression Management Theory and Diversity: Lessons for Organizational Behavior." American Behavioral
Scientist 37:601-04.
Rosenthal, John. 1992. "What Is Life? A Habermas Critique." Social Science Information
31:5-42.
Schlenker, Barry R. 1980. Impression Management. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Schon, Donald A. 1983. The Reflective Practitioner. New York: Basic Books.
Schroyer, Trent. 1973. The Critique of Domination. Boston, MA: Beacon.
Sciulli, David. 1989. "Analytical Limits of Communicative Action: Two Requirements of
Habermas' Critical Theory and of Societal
Constitutionalism." Current Perspectives in
Social Theory 9:55-90.
- - - . 1992a. Theory of Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical
Theory. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
- - - . 1992b. "Habermas, Critical Theory, and
the Relativistic Predicament." Symbolic Interaction 15:299-313.
Scott, Robert A. 1969. The Making of Blind Men.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Stein, Howard F. 1994. Listening Deeply: An Approach to Understanding and Consulting in
Organizational Culture. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Tedeschi, James T., ed. 1981. Impression Man-

agement Theory and Social Psychological Research. New York: Academic Press.
Tedeschi, James T. and Valerie Melburg. 1984.
"Impression Management and Influence in the
Organization." Pp. 31-58 in Research in the
Sociology of Organizations, vol. 3, edited by
S. B. Bacharach and E. J. Lawler. Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.
Torbert, William R. 1991. The Power of Balance:
Transforming Self, Society, and Scientific Inquiry. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Tseelon, Efrat. 1992a. "Is the Presented Self Sincere? Goffman, Impression Management and
the Postmodern Self." Theory, Culture and Society 9: 115-28.
- - - . 1992b. "Self-Presentation through Appearance: A Manipulative vs. a Dramaturgical
Approach." Symbolic Interaction 15:501-13.
von Cranach, M., K. Foppa, W. Lepenies, and D.
Ploog, eds. 1979. Human Ethology: Claims and

Limits of a New Discipline. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Welsh, John F. 1984. "The Presentation of Self
in Capitalist Society: Bureaucratic Visibility as
a Social Source of Impression Management."
Humanity and Society 8:253-71.
Whyte, William Foote. 1991. Participatory Action Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Wiley, Norbert. 1994. The Semiotic Self. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Willmott, Hugh. 1993. "Strength Is Ignorance,
Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in
Modern Organizations." Journal of Management Studies 30:515-52.
Wrong, Dennis H. 1961. "The Oversocialized
Conception of Man in Modern Sociology."
American Sociological Review 26: 183-93.
Young, Robert E. 1989. A Critical Theory of Education: Habermas and Our Children's Future.
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Post-print standardized by MSL Academic Endeavors, the imprint of the Michael Schwartz Library at Cleveland
State University, 2014

